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Summary
A  decision rule is said to be rational if it  is consistent with maximising expected  utility. Rational
decision rules can correctly accommodate objective and subjective criteria.  It is shown that portfolio
theory, as applied to sire  selection problems,  is  rational.  However, the underlying utility  function
must be linear or exponential and normality assumptions must hold.  Explicit use of utility  theory
and related Bayesian methodology is suggested for other selection problems. A  mate selection rule
is  described which  is  rational  and consistent  with  the  underlying  reason  for  positive  assortative
mating : to arrange future pedigree information by attempting to create extreme positive individuals.
The mate selection  rule  can  be  evaluated  sequentially  using mixed model methodology as  this
provides for the reuse of information on preassorted relatives.
Key words :  Bayesian methods, portfolio theory, positive assortative mating, mate  selection,  utility
theory.
Résumé
Théorie du portfolio,  théorie de l’utilité,  choix et accouplement des reproducteurs
Une  règle de décision est dite rationnelle si elle est cohérente avec la maximisation de l’espérance
de l’utilité. Des  règles de décision rationnelles peuvent en toute rigueur intégrer des critères objectifs
et  des  critères  subjectifs.  On montre  que  la  théorie  du  portfolio,  appliquée  aux problèmes de
sélection  et  d’accouplement des reproducteurs,  est  rationnelle.  Cependant,  il  faut que la  fonction
d’utilité sous-jacente soit linéaire ou  exponentielle et que les hypothèses de normalité soient vérifiées.
L’utilisation  explicite de la  théorie de l’utilité  et de la méthodologie bayésienne est suggérée pour
aborder d’autres problèmes de sélection.  On décrit une règle de sélection  et d’accouplement des
reproducteurs qui est rationnelle et cohérente avec  la motivation sous-jacente à l’homogamie  positive :
organiser l’information généalogique de la génération à venir afin  d’y créer des génotypes positifs
extrêmes. La règle de sélection et d’accouplement des reproducteurs peut être déterminée de façon
continue en utilisant  la  méthodologie du modèle mixte qui assure la  réutilisation  de l’information
sur des apparentés préalablement assortis.
Mots clés :  Méthodes bayésiennes,  théorie du portfolio,  homogamie  positive,  sélection et accou-
plement des reproducteurs,  théorie de l’utilité.I.  Introduction
Selection decisions, like most decisions, are affected by  subjective beliefs or percep-
tions.  Beliefs are subjective in that they are personal and may change from person to
person.  Classical  quantitative  genetics  has  largely  ignored  subjectivity.  However, the
importance of risk in applied genetics has been recognised (e.g., S CHNEEBERGER   et al.,
1982 ;  SMITH,  1985)  despite  the  fact  that  concerns  about  risk  are  mostly  subjective
(D ILL O N ,  1977).
Risk  exists  with  uncertainty and indeed D ILLON   (1977)  uses  the words risk  and
uncertainty interchangeably. Conditions such as infinite population size or infinite repli-
cation tend to remove uncertainty. For example, with infinite populations the response
due to  truncation  selection  is  deterministic.  Alternatively,  the average response from
an infinite  sequence of similar selection schemes is  constant.  It  follows that  concerns
about risk can be ignored under conditions of infinite  population size  or infinite  repli-
cation.  Risk can sometimes be ignored under conditions  of equal information when
equal  information  implies  equal  uncertainty  across  all  selection  alternatives.  In  this
situation uncertainty is  not removed but equalized.
While assumptions like infinite population size,  infinite replication and equal infor-
mation are  convenient they need not be  realistic.  Selection  of replacement breeding
animals involves decisions by a person or persons on behalf of enterprises.  Subjective
attitudes cannot generally be ignored. Moreover, because of subjective attitudes about
uncertainty, a unique and optimal decision will not usually exist for all decision-makers
given the same selection alternatives.
Concern about risk  may be mistakenly regarded  as  purely  objective ;  due to  a
belief that risk can be accommodated by :
1)  extending the planning horizon
2)  evaluating selection alternatives under condition of infinite  replication.
Concern about drift  in  finite  populations  is  sometimes quantified  in  this manner
(e.g., R OBERTSON ,  1960).  It may be reasonable to extend the planning horizon, but this
extension is  liable to make  the analysis very difficult. The above view is flawed because
infinite  replication  is  a corruption even for long planning horizons.
Portfolio  theory  has  been proposed  as  an  aid  to  decision-making  in  dairy  sire
selection (S CHNEEBERGER   et al.,  1982). The method is  purported to allow for both risk
and objective  criteria  in  the decision processes.  Given that  risk  should be considered
in  decision-making,  is  portfolio theory an appropriate tool to  deal with both objective
and subjective criteria?  In  this  paper we consider the issues  and show that portfolio
theory can lead to rational decisions as defined by the Bayesian. Ramifications will be
discussed  and we also  show how generated theory can be applied to mate selection
problems.
II.  Utility theory and the axioms of rational behavior
To determine if portfolio theory is  indeed rational we need to appeal to a higher
realm of meaning ; utility theory and the axioms of rational behavior (B ERGER ,  1980).
Utility theory can be regarded as a component of Bayesian decision theory.The  goal  of  selection  is  to  increase  merit  in  some  future  population.  This  is
accomplished by choosing one of several  possible  selection  alternatives  (e.g.  a group
of parents could be one selection alternative). In general, different selection alternatives
will  induce different outcomes of merit.
Using the terminology of B ERGER   (1980), we  will call a particular outcome of merit
a reward and denote  it  as  r.  Also,  let  the set  of all  possible rewards be denoted by
R. When  selection decisions are made there is  usually uncertainty about which r in R
will  be  realized.  Let P ; (r) represent  the  probability  distribution  function  of possible
rewards for the i-th- selection alternative. The quantities, P I (r), P 2 (r)..., can be regarded
as posterior distributions given data,  empirical experiences and subjective perceptions.
The distributions  can be constructed  using Bayesian methods (B ERGER ,  1980).  In  an
animal  breeding  context,  SMITH  & A LLAIRE   (1985)  show how to  use  mixed model
methodology to construct P ; (r) under normality. We  will not dwell on the construction
of P ; (r) in  this paper.
Given P l (r), P 2 (r)..., preference among selection alternatives can be quantified in
accordance  to  rationality  axioms (S HARPE ,  1970 ; B ERGER ,  1980).  The most desirable
selection alternative corresponds to the largest  of :
where U(r) is  an utility function defined by preference patterns. Thus, to be consistent
with rationality axioms, selection should maximise expected utility. To  violate this rule
is  to be what S HARPE   (1970) calls  &dquo;irrational&dquo;  or &dquo;unthinking&dquo;.  Were are interested in
finding out  if a decision based on  portfolio theory  can be  cast as a decision based on  (1).
Many  selection strategies in animal  breeding  are based on  maximising  the expectation
of r.  For such cases U(r)  is  an identity operator.  Because the goal of selection  is  to
maximise  r, we  can argue objectively that U(r) should be monotone  increasing. However,
there  is  no theory  that  forces  U(r)  to  be  an  identity  operator.  Some have argued
implicitly that U(r) 
= r due to infinite replication (e.g. B ULMER ,  1980). This argument
is  esoteric when decisions are not replicated.  Consider a decision to make one of two
choices, A  or B.  If we make A  we are guaranteed $ 1 000.  However, if we make B
we will do one of two things ; we might pay  $ 1 000 with probability % 5  or we might
be paid  $ 3 000 with probability I h. Most people would probably make the sure bet,
choice A. There might be a few gamblers that take choice B. The quantitative geneticist
who argues  infinite  replication  is  indifferent  to  the  choices,  because each has equal
expected rewards. Do we really want U(r) 
=  r ?
Utility theory need not contradict classical selection theory. For example, selection
strategies  are sometimes invariant  to the  shape of U(r)  if  U(r)  is  at  least monotone
increasing and given equal uncertainty across all selection alternatives, i.e., equal accuracies
such as exist with mass selection.  Usually,  it  is when classical assumptions break down
that we have contradictions. In general, U(r) will be affected by an individual’s gambling
philosophy and this  will  affect selection decisions.III.  Portfolio theory
A. Description
Only a segment of portfolio  theory  is  investigated  here ;  that  indicated  by the
objective function described by S CHNEEBERGER   et al.  (1982).
With the approach of S CHNEEBERGER   et al.  (1982)
where w  is  a row vector of non-negative weights which sum to one (or a number less
than one) and s  is a column vector of economic merits associated with sires. The vector
w  will  define the usage of sires  in  the breeding program.  Different realizations of w
correspond to  different  selection  alternatives.  The goal of selection  is  to  find w  such
that r  is  maximum under certain constraints.
Given w and information on sires it  is  possible to compute the mean and variance
of r,  as outlined by S CHNEEBERGER   et al.  (1982).  Define
The subscript w  is  a reminder that  the mean and variance are functions of w. With
the portfolio approach, w  is  chosen so as to maximise
where k  is a constant that reflects an individual’s attitude about risk. When  k  is negative,
zero  and positive  the  attitudes  are  described  as  risk  aversive,  risk  neutral  and risk
prone, respectively (S CHNEEBERGER   et al. ,  1982).  Objective (2)  is  maximised subject to
linear and non-negativity constraints.
B. Accusation
Given the importance of utility  theory,  it  is  natural to suspect that past attempts
have  been made to  show the  equivalence  or  non-equivalence  of  utility  theory  and
maximising (2). Indeed, N AYLOR   & V ERNON   (1969, p. 420) claim that (2) can be equated
to expected utility.  However, the proof which is found in F ARRAR   (1962, p.  20) seems
questionable. The derivation of F ARRAR   is  based on expanding U(r) by a Taylor series
and  taking expectation. A  similar approximation of expected utility is given by A NDERSON
et al.  (1977) and is
where U&dquo;(M,)  is  the second derivative of U(r) evaluated at r = M w .  We  see no way
of equating (2) and the right side of (3).  Moreover, it  is  easy to show that (2) cannot
equal the expectation of some utility  function when k + 0 (see Appendix).
S HARPE   (1970) argues that an utility function must be quadratic  if it is to be consistent
with  the concerns of those who would use  portfolio  theory,  i.e.  concerns about M w
and V!. Though S HARPE   recognizes the contributions of utility  theory,  he ultimately
discards it  because a quadratic utility function implies an unrealist behavior. However,
we do not agree that concerns only with M w   and V W   imply a quadratic utility function.
For example,  when r  is  a  normal random variable  expected  utility  is  an exclusivefunction of the mean and variance and this result is independent of the utility function.
Thus, we regard the  negative  argument of S HARPE   as  an incomplete justification  of
portfolio theory.
If  maximising  (2)  is  inconsistent  with  utility  theory one might wonder how (2)
accommodates risk.  If (2)  is not expected utility what is  it? A  justification for the use
of portfolio theory exists and it  is  consistent with utility  theory.
C. Acquittal
We  construct a rational decision rule that  is  equivalent to the portfolio approach.
First we will  design  a monotone utility  function,  say U + (r), possessing and attribute
which seems reasonable from a portfolio outlook. There is  a constancy about risk  as
it  is treated by (2) ;  decisions based on (2) are invariant to location shifts of r.  In fact,
location invariance is a major property from which significant results follow. The utility
function, U + (r),  will be  such  that the resulting decision rule is invariant to location shifts.
The equation,
represents a statement of indifference.  For any h and r a P (P s  [0,1])  can be found
where (4)  holds.  Consider a decision  to make one of two choices, A  or B.  If A  is
made we will obtain r with probability one.  If B is  made we could obtain r +  h with
probability P or we could obtain r &mdash;  h with probability  1 &mdash;  P.  Equation (4) says that
values associated with gambles A  and B are equal.
If the decision  rule based on U + (r)  is  invariant to location  shifts,  then (4) must
hold for  all  r  because  statements of indifference  are  decisions.  Thus,  for  any h (4)
holds for all  r,  where P  is  a function of h but not r.  In the Appendix, we prove that
U + (r)  can only be a linear or exponential function. 
,
When U + (r)  is  strictly monotone increasing
b  >  0,  c  >  0,  depending on one’s approach to risk.  It can be shown that the utility
functions given by (5.1),  (5.2)  and (5.3) produce decision rules which are invariant to
location shifts.  These decision rules are also invariant to the constants a and b.
P RATT   (1964) has derived (5.1),  (5.2)  and (5.3)  from consideration of a function
(i.e.,  U’(r)/U&dquo;(r))  that  depicts  the  degree  of risk. P RATT   referred  to  utility  (5.1)  as
concave and  corresponding to a decision-maker  with a constant aversion to risk. Likewise,
utilities  (5.2) and (5.3) correspond to decision-makers with constant attitudes about risk
being risk neutral and risk prone, respectively. Note also that the parameter c in (5.1)
and (5.3)  acts as a scale effect in quantifying risk.
The insistence that decisions should only be based on M w   and V!, as in portfolio
theory, suggests a strong preoccupation with normality. A  distribution which possesses
only the first  two cumulants is,  by necessity, normal. A  stronger argument is  given in
the Appendix that supports the belief that  r  is  treated as normal. Moreover, we will
see later that when r  is  not normal, decisions based on (2)  can be irrational.  One of
the shortcomings of previous use of portfolio theory is  that distributional assumptionsare rarely made explicit.  Normality seems to be an assumption, though S HARPE   (1970)
gives  a contrary view.  All assumptions implied or otherwise should be highlighted so
that the feasibility of (2)  can be assessed.
Assume that for any w, r  has  a normal distribution.  If U + (r)  equals  (5.1),  the
expected utility  is
Now maximising (6)  is  tantamount to maximising
Likewise, maximising expectations of (5.2)  and (5.3)  are the same as maximising
respectively. We  have clearly vindicated the proposal of S CHNEEBERGER   et  al.  (1982).
A  rational person involved in decision-making must act as if he had implemented
Bayesian machinery (e.g.  a  utility  function).  However, such a person need not have
carried out a Bayesian analysis (B ERGER ,  1980).  That is,  rational  person could have
arrived at a decision in an indirect way. The portfolio approach can be considered an
example of an indirect process.
D. Ramifications
Having shown what maximising (2) implies, we can now  ask the question ; are the
hidden assumptions justified? The hidden assumptions are :
1)  Normality.
2) The utility  function is  a given by (5.1),  (5.2)  or (5.3).
It  is  not possible  to  categorically  refute  or support these assumptions as applied
to particular problems. We  can only suggest what might happen when assumptions are
not satisfied and comment on what alternative procedures might be used.
When  normality breaks down  decisions based on  (2) can be irrational. For example,
assume  that  k  in  (2)  is 
-  0.05  (risk  aversion).  Now consider  making one  of two
decisions, A  or B.  If A  is  made a sure $ 100 is  earned.  If B  is made $ 150 could be
earned with probability I h  or $ 300 could be earned with probability lh. Because  variance
is  penalised, A  will  be picked over B if  (2)  is  used as  a  criterion.  Yet no rational
person would ever  pick A  over B.  Alternatively,  if  expected  utility  is  used, B will
always be picked over A  regardless of the risk philosophy, i.e.  if the correct distributions
are used to evaluate expectations.
The practitioner may be unwilling to use one of the utility  functions,  (5.1),  (5.2)
or (5.3). Alternative utility functions can be found in A NDERSO rv  et al.  (1977) and P RATT
(1964).  Evaluating the  expectation  of a more general  utility  function could be done
with techniques described in  SMITH  & A LLAIRE   (1985).  Approximation (3)  might also
prove to be useful.
There are other complications with the use of (2) that should be considered. Until
now, r  has been taken as a univariate quantity.  However, in  practice  r  will  typically
be  multivariate.  Decisions  based  on  expected  utility  of  multivariate  r  are  at  least
conceptually clear. However, a multivariate extension of (2)  is not so obvious. Compli-cations also occur when intermediate r is optimum. For this case, an appropriate utility
function is likely non-montone and use of (2) is inappropriate. Whereas decisions based
on (2) can be rational, the explicit use of utility theory and related Bayesian methods
offers greater flexibility.
Pure risk aversive attitudes (e.g. when k in (2) is negative) are sometimes doubtful
when long-term objectives  are  sought.  An example where this  is  true  is  gene pool
selection.  SMITH  & A LLAIRE   (1985)  described  the  additive  merit  (a)  of an individual
taken at random from some gene pool as :  a = a,  + a 2 ,  where a ¡   equals the average
additive genetic effect of all  base animals that contribute genes to the pool and a 2   is
the additive genetic effect due to segregation in the random mating gene pool. We  will
assume that  it  is  desired to maximise long-term additive merit.  In selecting  &dquo;parents&dquo;
of the pool, a, and a 2   should be considered separately. Practitioners are liable to have
a risk aversive attitude when considering the a ¡   that would result from  various selection
alternatives. However, a risk aversive attitude about a 2   is unreasonable. Concerns about
long-term response imply that  variance  of a 2   is  desirable.  This variance  will  tend to
decrease with increasing inbreeding  (i.e.,  drift)  in the gene pool. The reward of any
selection alternative may be taken as the vector (a i ,v), where v is  the variance of a 2 .
A  selection alternative influences v as a function of the number of parents of each sex
and the  relationships  among the parents.  Utility  functions of (a l ,  v)  that might find
application  and are  risk  aversive with respect to  a,  are represented by : U(a ¡ ,  v) =
-  exp {- ca l  -  f(v)} where  c >  0 and  f(.)  is monotone increasing. There may  be some
breeders who are risk prone with respect to at.  For them, utility functions of the form
U(a l ,  v) 
= exp{ca l   +  f(v)} may be useful.  Breeders who are risk neutral with respect
to a, might try a ¡   +  f(v). These three classes represent all rational decision rules which
are : unaffected by  shifts in the genetic  base ; and  consistent with maximising a ¡   and  v.
Consider the vector of weights,  w, defined for the portfolio  approach and let  it
represent  the  proportion of genes  that  various parents  contribute  to  the gene pool.
Given the  assumption of panmixia, the genomic table described in  SMITH & A LLAIRE
(1985) can be manipulated to show that v = a 2   (1 - 1 h  w’Aw), where a 2   is  the additive
genetic variance and A  is the relationship matrix for parents. If it  is desired to calculate
w  so as to maximise expected utility  where U(a l ,  v) _ - exp {- ca t  -  dv}, exp fca l
+ dv} or a, +  dv, d  >  0,  then objective (2) can be used by adding &mdash;  bw’Aw, where
b 
=  (d a z )/(2c) or d ( J ’2. The modified objective function is  still  a quadratic function in
w and hence quadratic programming can be implemented to find the optimum w. For
other problems, selection alternatives may  be associated with uncertain w. This situation
is harder but we  might take advantage of the relation E[w’Aw] 
=  tr[A(qq’ + Q)], where
q 
=  E[w] and Q 
=  Var(w).
In the next section we describe applications of utility theory with mate selection.
In particular we describe  a  rational  objective which is  consistent with the underlying
reason for positive assortative mating. Unlike concerns about risk, the philosophy behind
positive  assortative  mating  can  be  justified  under  conditions  of  infinite  replication.
Indeed, concerns about risk appear to be opposite to this  philosophy.
IV. Mate selection
Mate selection  is  defined as the selection of parents and the formation of mating
pairs (A LLAIRE ,  1980 ;  SMITH  & A LLAIRE ,  1985). A LLAIRE   (1980)  has suggested  that
non-random mating practices imply a non-linear objective.Mate  selection  was  originally  proposed  as  a  method  to  enhance  the  value  of
replacement animals where  value is determined by a non-linear merit function. However,
here we consider the improvement of additive genetic merit rather than with non-linear
merit.  The formation  of  special  mating  pairs  will  do  little  to  enhance  the  average
additive merit of the progeny produced by those matings. However, if the objective of
selection is to enhance average merit after several generations, mate selection is a useful
tool. We may infer that this objective  is  non-linear.
Selection  and positive  assortative  mating is  an example of a mate selection  rule
that  can enhance long-term  additive  merit.  Selection works directly  to  increase merit
in the progeny. Position assortative mating works to increase heritability in the progeny
and thus  the  merit  in  the  second  generation. McB RI DE  & R OBERTSON   (1963)  have
demonstrated that selection coupled with positive assortative mating can lead to a greater
selection response than selection with random  mating. Combined  selection and  assortative
mating is  beneficial when heritability  is  high,  selection intensity is  low and the trait  is
polygenic (D E  L ANGE ,  1974). BAKER (1973) claimed that assortative mating will increase
response to selection by no more than 4 or 5 p. 100 in most situations. This assessment
is  based on populations where the fraction selected is 20 p. 100 or less. We  agree with
BAKER but note  his  figures  are  underestimated by as  much as  two percentage  units
because selection response was assumed  proportional to the genotypic standard deviation.
This  is  only so when heritability  is  close  to  one. When heritability  is  close  to  zero,
response  is  proportional to the genotypic variance. A  final  point of contention is  that
BAKER implicitly assumed normality in the offspring of selected parents. The appropria-
teness of this  assumption needs to be investigated when heritability  is  high and when
parents are mated assortatively.
Early  studies  on combined selection  and assortative  mating seem to  imply that
assortative  mating is  done to  enhance selection  response by increasing heritability  in
the progeny. For example, BAKER (1973) evaluated assortative mating under conditions
of mass selection, which is  reasonable if heritability  is  the primary concern. However,
we suggest that there are good reasons to consider different selection schemes and in
particular use of a selection index that incorporates information on preassorted relatives.
Heritability needs not be the sole concern.
Let Ip  denote a  set  of records on parents and let C  specify the way parents are
mated.  For example, C indicates  the mating pattern such  as  assortative  mating or a
realization from a random mating scenario. Let C 
= C a   when parents are selected and
mated assortatively on Ip.  Then, conditional on Ip U  C a   where U  is  the union operator,
all other aspects of assortative mating are redundant. On  the average, assortative mating
causes an increase in the additive genetic variance of progeny compared to cases when
C denotes random mating.  Indeed,  assortative  mating differentiates  progeny so  that
some progeny are more desirable  than  others and the  estimated  rank order can be
determined from Ip U C ’ .
Let 1 0   denote a  set  of records on offspring of the parents  previously described.
To carry out mass selection on progeny we can use the information 1 0   U C a .  However,
because of sampling the rank order estimated from I o   U C a   will  not be the same as
the rank order estimated from Ip U  C,,.  As the rank orders become less alike the prior
differentiation of progeny becomes more superfluous and at the limit assortative mating
will show no advantage. The appropriate thing to do is  to use all  the information, i.e.
Ip U  1 0   U C a ,  because : the resulting selection index or selection rule will have maximum
accuracy ; the rank orders determined from I P  U  1 0   U C a   and Ip U C a   will generally be
closer than those determined by 1 0   U C a   and I P  U  C a -In effect, we  have argued that assortative mating  is implemented  to : create extreme
positive  individuals ;  arrange  future  pedigree  information  (in  the  attempt  to  create
extreme positive individuals).  Therefore, an evaluation of assortative mating should at
least consider progeny selected by an index which includes information on  all preassorted
relatives.  With such  a  selection  scheme SMITH  & H AMMOND   (1987)  showed that  the
relative  efficiencies  of assortative  mating over random mating are  significantly  larger
than when mass selection is  used. 
’
Mate selection,  as a theoretical decision problem, can be very difficult.  Concerns
about  mating  pairs  and  additivity  imply  a  long  term  perspective.  Whilst  evaluating
expected utility or merit for the next generation is  straightforward, extensions beyond
one  generation  are  complicated.  On the  other  hand,  the  practice  of selection  and
assortative mating seems to be relatively  easy ;  simply select and mate in  accordance
to rank order of estimated merit. However, there are two practical concerns that could
cause problems for the intuitive  approach, viz.
(1)  Realistic constraints on the number  of times an animal might be used in mating
(not used, once or several times) should be considered in a joint selection and mating
problem. We  refer to these constraints as mating constraints.
(2)  Additive merit  is  estimated with error and usually with unequal information.
A  rational procedure that assigns a value to a particular mating combination is desired
and we cannot be sure  that  consideration of only estimated merits,  whilst  neglecting
the errors of estimation,  is  enough.
We  do not attempt to design a complicated mate selection rule by considering an
extended planning horizon.  Rather, we describe  a simple mate selection  rule that is
consistent with the salient features of associative mating. To mimic selection and assor-
tative mating, the Bayesian would define probability distributions for the additive merit
of potential progeny and identify those distributions that are regarded as desirable. The
more extreme and positive the progeny are likely  to be the more desirable the distri-
butions.
For mate selection formulations of J ANSEN   & W ILTON   (1985) and SMITH  & A LLAIRE
(1985), utility is assigned to individual mating combinations and summed  over all combi-
nations in the selection  alternative.  Consider an objective function of the form
where  x;! 
=  0 or 1 and A ij   is additive merit (perhaps aggregate) for the progeny produced
by mating the i-th male, to the j-th female (or egg cell).  The mate selection problem
is  solved by finding those x;!  such that  (7)  is maximum subject to mating constraints.
If  x;! 
=  1 when  the solution  is found  the  i-th male  is to be  mated  with  the  _j-th female.
In  (7),  f(A)  is  understood to  be monotone increasing and thus consistent  with
maximising  additive merit. Because  objective (7) represents a  simple sum  of  contributions
from would be progeny,  it  is  not good at quantifying risk (and in particular the risk
due  to  drift). Hence,  it is necessary  to place constraints (perhaps  irrational) on  x,, such  aswhere n i   is  the maximum number of times the  i-th male can be mated ; and
where N  is  the number of progeny to be selected. The top constraints are needed as
it  is  typical  for females to be mated once or not  at  all.  It  may be desired to  avoid
certain mating combinations (denoted by the index set 0) because of inbreeding. These
types of constraints are enforced passively by subtracting a sufficiently large cost from
(7) when x ij  
=  1  and i, j  E   O.
The  mate  selection problem  can be solved by linear programming  techniques (J ANSEN
& W ILTON ,  1985) and problem (1)  listed above can be accommodated.
Problem (2) can also be dealt with. Our development on previous mate selection
theory is  the incorporation of (f’).  If f(’)  is monotone and convex, objective (7) places
a  rational  premium on extreme  positive  individuals ;  mate selection  is  coupled with
positive assortative mating. If f(’)  is monotone and concave mate selection induces the
negative  assortative  mating  of selected parents.  If  f(’)  is  linear,  no particular mating
combination is  favoured within some feasible set.  In addition to theses properties, the
strategy will assign a value to the variability of A ii   depending on the curvature of f(’).
If  f(’)  is  convex,  then  variability  is  favoured and this  is  desirable from a  long-term
perspective (V AN   RwDSN et al.  (1984) made a similar arguement in a sire  problem).
What kind of function should f(’)  be? At the very least  it  should be monotone
increasing and if positive assortative mating is  desired, convex. Numerous functions fit
these requirements but there is  only one function, (5.3),  that results in a decision rule
unaffected by location shifts  (objective  (7) can usually be represented as E[f(r)] where
r  is  a randomized reward). When the  additive  genetic mean is  not well defined,  use
of (5.3)  is  proposed. The objective function  (7)  would then be a sum of expectation
of functions like  (5.3).
We  give a brief illustration. Assume equal information so that variance terms can
be  ignored  and let  f(’) 
=  exp (’).  It  is  desired  to mate two males (M I ,  M 2 )  to  two
females (F l ,  F 2 )  so  that  all  animals  are mated once and objective  (7)  is  maximum.
There are two selection alternatives : (M i   x F l ,  M 2   x F 2 )  and (M I   x F z ,  M 2   x F I ).  Let
the estimated merits be 1.1,  2.0,  1.5,  1.9 for M i ,  M 2 ,  F i   and F 2 ,  respectively.  Under
conditions of normality,  (7)  is  proportional to
for (M i   x F 2 ,  M 2   x F ¡ ).  Objective (7)  is maximum when parents are mated assor-
tatively.V. Discussion
We have investigated a component of portfolio theory and found it  to be rational
provided certain assumptions are  satisfied.  As a side issue we described an interesting
way of viewing mate selection.  Consideration of rationality,  risk and information has
proven very useful.
In  our formulation of mate selection,  we have assumed that  total  utility  can be
represented as a sum of utilities from individuals in the selected population. Moreover,
relationships among animals and concerns about risk have been ignored in the utility
function.  This  is  tantamount to  assuming that  the  selected  population comprises  an
infinite number of sufficiently unrelated animals.  Lastly, we have assumed that loading
additive  merits into extreme positive  individuals  is  desirable.  This is  reasonable when
information  is  reused from generation  to  generation.  In  a  multiple-trait  setting,  the
reuse  of information may be critical  because estimated  merit  is  affected  not just  by
economic weights but by a complicated covariance structure. Mating  parents assortatively
by an economic index will almost surely be suboptimal when information is not reused.
A  different criterion of desirability one based on maximising accuracy of selection, was
given  by F ERNANDO   & G IANOLA   (1984)  for  the  multiple-trait  case.  However,  these
authors did not consider selection and mating together.
It  is  difficult to make general statements about mate selection using objective (7).
However, the proposal is  amenable to simulation under various constraints (e.g. popu-
lation size and  structure, level of  information, selection pressure) and  values of  c in (5.3).
Objective  (7)  can be evaluated by use of mixed model methodology, as outlined
by SMITH  & A LLAIRE   (1985).  Hence mate selection  rules  can accommodate unequal
information, selection or mating bias, fixed effects, etc. More importantly, mixed model
methodology allows the reuse of information in mate selection problems.
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Appendix
(a) Proof that objective (2) cannot equal expected utility
To show that (2) cannot equal expected utility we make an argument of contradic-
tion.  Assume there exists a utility  function, U * (r), such that
where the  subscript p,  in  this  case,  signifies  a probability  distribution function  for  r.
Consider  a  hypothetical  sequence of probability  distribution  functions,  say  P,, P 2 ...,
such that
where the subscript p n   represents an indexed distribution. We  are assuming that the
set of allowable distributions  [i.e.,  the set of distribution for which (2) applies] is richenough to include such a sequence for any real number  x.  If the set is not rich enough
then the use of (2)  would be severely restricted and nothing else need be said.  The
set of normal distributions is  rich enough to include (P l ,  P 2 ...).  It  follows that
The  limiting  distribution, P a ,  can  be  thought  of  as  a  function  that  assigns  a
probability mass of one to r 
=  x. Thus, with appropriate regularity conditions, the right
side of (8)  can be equated to U * (x). Hence, we have shown that
and this is  true for all x (in our formulation x is  unspecified). However, for a general
distribution,
when k 4- 0.  Thus, we have arrived  at  a contradiction.
(b)  Proof that U + (r)  is  a linear or exponential function
First consider the case where P 4=  0 or 1  in  (4).  Equation (4) can be written as
Like (4),  (9)  holds for all  r.  Consequently, recursive application of (9)  yields :
Now by definition
Applying the summation to the right side of (10)  gives :
Thus, we have shown that U + (r  + Nh) equalsdepending on G(h). The derivation assumes N  is  a positive integer. However, identities
(11.1)  and (11.2)  hold when N  is  a non-positive integer as well. When N 
=  0 this  is
obvious. To  see the validity of  (11.1) and  (11.2) when  N  is negative, note  that (9) implies
Recursive application of (12)  yields
Summing both sides  of (13)  from n = 0 to n = N -  1 leads to  identities  (11.1)  and
(11.2)  where N  is  allowed to  be negative.  Furthermore,  if P 
=  0 or  1,  it  is  easy to
show that  (11.1) holds where V(r, h) 
=  0.
Taking r 
=  0, we see that U + (Nh)  is either a linear or exponential (with intercept)
function of the whole number  N. Alternatively, U + (t)  is a linear or exponential function
(say  g(t))  if  t  E   {Nh : N  =  0,  ± 1,  ±  2,...}  = 12 (h).  When t E   DNh *  :  N  =  0,  ± 1,
± 2, ...} 
=  ft (h * )  and h *  =1= h, U + (t)  is also a linear or exponential function (say g * (t)).
However, we cannot be  sure  that g * (t) 
=  g(t).  If h *  
=  Kh, where K,  is  a  rational
number, then there are an infinite number  of  points common  to both SZ (h) and fl (h * ).
In which case g * (t) 
=  g(t)  because U + (t) 
=  g(t) 
= g * (t) if  t E  il  (h)  f1  S2 (h * )  where
fl  is  the intersection operator. This implies U + (t) 
=  g(t) if t  E   {Kh : K  rational} 
=  fl.
Assuming  that U + (z) =1= g(z) for some z  S2, leads to a contradiction. All neighbourhoods
of z contain points contained in  S,2  Monotinicity of U + (’)  implies
where z,  <  z  <  Z2   and z l ,  Z2  6  fl-
The upper and lower bonds in  (14)  can be made sharper and sharper thus inducing
the desired contradiction.  This shows that U + (t) 
=  g(t)  for  all  t.
(c)  Strong argument that suggests objective (2) implies normality
To suggest that r  is  treated as normal we will assume that use of objective (2)  is
consistent with maximising expected utility.  If this  is  not true,  the portfolio approach
would be irrational  and nothing else  need be said.  As objective  (2)  is  unaffected by
location shifts  the underlying utility  function is  almost certainly one of (5.1),  (5.2)  or
(5.3).  Note first  that when the utility function is  linear  [i.e.,  (5.2)] normality need not
hold ;  expected  utility  involves  only  the mean and this  result  is  independent of the
distribution.  Thus,  the  distribution  of r  is  only an issue  when the  utility  function  is
exponential [i.e.,  (5.1)  or (5.3)].
If maximising objective (2)  is  equivalent to maximising expected utility (EU), then
there must be some  function of EU,  a, b and c [say f(EU, a, b, c)] that equals objective
(2) [recall a, b and c come from (5.1) or (5.3)]. The functional form of f is independent
of the distribution of  r. However,  it must  be  that maximising  f is equivalent to maximising
EU. To proceed further we must determine f.
As with part a) of the Appendix we will use a sequence of probability distribution
functions,  say P I , P 2 &dquo; ’ ,  such thatWe assume  that  the  set  of allowable distributions  is  rich  enough to  include  such a
sequence for any real number x.  Moreover, we assume that f is  a continuous function
of EU. When the utility  function equals (5.3)  [a similar argument can be made when
utility  equals (5.1)]  the limiting value of EU  is
The limiting value of f or objective  (2)  is  x.  It  follows that f is  defined implicity
for all x by
and this implies
Note that (EU - a)/b is  the moment generating function {i.e., E[exp(cr)]} for r.  Equa-
ting  f to  (2) we obtain
where M  and V  are the mean and variance of r,  respectively.  To prove normality it
suffices to show that k 
= l hc. We  know only that k is  a function of c[say k(c)].
We  will now assume that  if  r  is  a member of the class of allowable distributions
so is  tr where t  is  any positive constant. The mean and variance of tr  are
tM and t 2 V.
Thus, the moment generating function given by (15)  is
If we devine c *  
=  ct,  from (15) we obtain
where k *  
=  k(ct).  Equating (16)  and (17)  shows that
ck(c)t 2  
=  ctk(ct)
and setting c 
=  1  yields k(t) 
=  k(I)t.  That is,  k(t)  [or k(c)]  is  proportional to t  (or c).
As the  log of (15)  must be a legitimate cumulant generating function  it  follows that
k(c) = !  c.